

Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00
INRE-00 ACDE-00 /026 W
-----127979 061942Z /47
P 061908Z MAR 78
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6846

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 GENEVA 03498

EXDIS

USSALTTWO

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PARM
SUBJECT: HIGHLIGHTS OF POST-PLenary DISCUSSIONS, MARCH 2,
1978 (SALT TWO - 1649)

1. (ROWNY/BELETSKY, A-2063)

NEW TYPES

BELETSKY SAID HE AGREED THAT QUESTION OF NEW TYPES WAS
MOST IMPORTANT ITEM SEPARATING US. THIS ISSUE WENT TO
HEART OF QUESTION OF WHETHER OR NOT THERE WOULD BE EQUALITY
AND EQUAL SECURITY BETWEEN SIDES.

HEAVY BOMBERS

BELETSKY SAID SOVIET SIDE HAD RESTATED ITS POSITION TODAY.
THEY HAD ANSWERED OUR QUESTIONS AND NOW IT WAS UP TO US TO
ANSWER THEIRS.

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BELETSKY SAID SOVIETS WERE PROMPT IN ANSWERING OUR QUES-
TIONS. HE SAID EIGHTEEN ICBM LAUNCHERS AT TYURATAM WERE
"PURELY FOR TESTING AND TRAINING PERSONNEL" AND THEREFORE
NOT TO BE COUNTED IN AGGREGATE NUMBER.

2. (JOHNSON/SHCHUKIN, A-2066)

CRUISE MISSILES

SHCHUKIN NOTED THAT AFTER TODAY'S PLENARY EXCHANGE REGARDING CRUISE MISSILE RANGE, EVERYTHING WAS SO CONFUSED THAT PERHAPS IT WOULD BE BEST TO LET THE DRAFTING GROUP HANDLE THE MATTER. REFERRING TO JOHNSON'S MENTION OF SOVIET CRUISE MISSILES HAVING FLOWN MORE THAN 600 KM, SHCHUKIN SAID HE DID NOT KNOW OF, NOR DID HE BELIEVE THERE WERE ANY SOVIET CRUISE MISSILES WHICH HAD FLOWN FURTHER THAN 600 KM. JOHNSON'S INFORMATION WAS DBVIOUSLY ERRO-NEOUS. SHCHUKIN DID NOT UNDERSTAND WHY U.S. WAS SO INCON-SISTENT WITH RESPECT TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF HORIZONTAL MANEUVERS WITHOUT CONSIDERING ADDITIONAL DISTANCE COVERED BY CRUISE MISSILES DUE TO HORIZONTAL MANEUVERS. SHCHUKIN EMPHASIZED HE WANTED TO BE CERTAIN THAT DEFINITION OF A 600 KM CRUISE MISSILE RANGE BE REALISTIC. SHCHUKIN OB-SERVED THAT MATERIAL WHICH RECENTLY HAD BEEN COMING TO HIM FROM DRAFTING GROUP SERVED TO MAKE HIM WARY. WHEN HE HAD LAST BEEN IN MOSCOW HE HAD PARTICIPATED IN DISCUSSIONS WHICH HAD LED TO FORMULATIONS WHICH SUBSEQUENTLY BECAME SOVIET DELEGATION'S INSTRUCTIONS. AT THAT TIME IT HAD SEEMED TO HIM CRUISE MISSILE RANGE WAS ONE OF MORE SIMPLE PROBLEMS FACING DELEGATIONS, THOUGH HE DID RECOGNIZE THAT VERTICAL PROFILE AND QUESTION OF STANDARD DESIGN MODE DID INTRODUCE SOME INDEFINITENESS TO SOVIET DEFINITION. SHCHUKIN SAID SIDES MUST NOT SPEAK OF CRUISE MISSILE RANGE

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IN CONNECTION WITH THINGS OUTSIDE OF MISSILE ITSELF, SUCH AS COMMUNICATION LINKS. IF ONE EXAMINED RANGE OF A MISSILE IN THIS MANNER HOW COULD NTM VERIFY FACT THAT PARTICULAR CRUISE MISSILE HAS RANGE NOT GREATER THAN CERTAIN NUMBER OF KILOMETERS? HE NOTED THAT QUESTION OF RANGE NOT GREATER THAN 600 KM AND 2500 KM WAS MATTER ON WHICH SIDES HAD AGREED.

SHCHUKIN SAID IF SOVIET FORMULATION FOR CRUISE MISSILE RANGE DEFINITION WAS NOT SATISFACTORY, IT WOULD BE GOOD FOR U.S. SIDE TO MAKE PROPOSALS WITH AIM OF MAKING DEFINITION MORE VERIFIABLE BY NTM. AN EXAMPLE, WHICH SHCHUKIN BELIEVED SIDES WERE IN AGREEMENT ON, WAS THAT IF A BAL-LISTIC MISSILE WAS TESTED IN NDN-OPTIMAL TRAJECTORY, FOR EXAMPLE VERY HIGH TRAJECTORY, IT MIGHT NOT FLY TO INTER-CONTINENTAL RANGE IN TERMS OF GREAT CIRCLE DISTANCE. HOW-EVER, IF NTM DETERMINED THAT THIS MISSILE HAD AN ENERGY POTENTIAL WHICH WOULD ALLOW IT TO FLY FURTHER THAN 5500 KM, THEN THIS MISSILE WOULD BE CONSIDERED AN INTERCONTI-NENTAL MISSILE. SHCHUKIN BELIEVED THAT WITH RESPECT TO CRUISE MISSILES WE SHOULD FOLLOW THE ABOVE PRECEDENT AS CLOSELY AS POSSIBLE. THE INDEFINITENESS WHICH OCCURRED AS

THE RESULT OF PRAGMATIC APPROACH WORRIED SHCHUKIN BECAUSE IT RAISED QUESTION OF INABILITY OF NTM TO DETERMINE CRUISE MISSILE RANGE. SHCHUKIN BELIEVED THAT THERE WAS STILL LESS INDEFINITENESS IN SOVIET DEFINITION THAN IN U.S. DEFINITION, BECAUSE SOVIET SIDE EXCLUDED CONSIDERATION OF ADDITIONAL DISTANCE FLOWN BY CRUISE MISSILE DURING HORIZONTAL MANEUVERS. SOVIET DEFINITION HAD UNCERTAINTY IN TERMS OF VERTICAL MANEUVERS AND A CERTAIN AMOUNT RELATIVE TO STANDARD DESIGN MODE BUT THEY WERE MUCH LESS THAN UNCERTAINTIES

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-----127985 061944Z /47

P 061908Z MAR 78
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6847

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EXDIS

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OF NOT CONSIDERING ADDITIONAL DISTANCE FLOWN BY CRUISE MISSILE DUE TO HORIZONTAL MANEUVERS FROM POINT OF LAUNCH TO TARGET.

HEAVY BOMBERS

SHCHUKIN SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR SIDES TO CONCENTRATE ON REALLY IMPORTANT ISSUES OF NEGOTIATIONS AND NOT TO ATTACH EXCESSIVE SIGNIFICANCE TO ISSUES LESS IMPORTANT IN REALITY. THEREFORE, PERSISTENT STATEMENTS BY U.S. SIDE REGARDING TU-142 ASW AIRCRAFT WERE HARDLY CONDUCTIVE TO MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING. FURTHERMORE, IF WE APPLIED APPROACH OF U.S. SIDE, U.S. LONG RANGE ASW AIRCRAFT COULD BE INCLUDED UNDER SUCH DEFINITION. EARLE

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: AGREEMENTS, SALT (ARMS CONTROL), NEGOTIATIONS, MEETING REPORTS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 06 mar 1978
Decaption Date: 20 Mar 2014
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978GENEVA03498
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: X1
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D780101-0092
Format: TEL
From: GENEVA USSALTTWO
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t197803104/aaaadjwr.tel
Line Count: 165
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 6237f8b7-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 14 jun 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 3109921
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: HIGHLIGHTS OF POST-PLenary DISCUSSIONS, MARCH 2, 1978 (SALT TWO - 1649)
TAGS: PARM, US, UR
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odhc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/6237f8b7-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014